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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the crisis of 1860-61, the architects of Southern secession were 
determined to justify their drastic action in legal terms.  Not for them 
was a resort to naked power politics, in which brute force would be its 
own badge of legitimacy.  This firmly legalistic outlook on the part of 
Southern leaders had been building up over the preceding decades.  An 
important early figure was Robert J. Turnbull of South Carolina, who 
became the principal intellectual mentor of John C. Calhoun.  In 1827, in 
a book called The Crisis (assembled from a series of articles written over 
the previous year), Turnbull pointed to the steady excess of population 
growth in the free states relative to the slave ones.  This of course 
translated, with the passage of years, into a constant growth of the 
political strength of the free states over the slave ones in the federal 
Congress.  In addition, there was the continuing fear of a long-term 
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alliance between the Northeastern and Midwestern states, in the form of 
Henry Clay’s proposed “American System” of protective tariffs and 
internal improvements.  (An enthusiastic supporter of Clay and his 
American System was an ambitious Illinois lawyer and politician named 
Abraham Lincoln.)  In the face of this growing challenge, the proper 
strategy for the South, Turnbull contended, was resolute insistence on 
respect for the sovereign rights of the states.1  As will be seen, these 
rights of the states were asserted, in the secession crisis, not against the 
federal government as such, but rather against the free states.  
Southerners, in short, held themselves to be on the firmest of legal 
grounds in referring to the conflict of 1861-65 as the “War between the 
States.” 
For the marshalling of the arguments in support of their action, the 
South possessed two particularly notable legal paladins.  One was 
Alexander Stephens of Georgia, who served as vice-President of the 
Confederacy and (more notably for present purposes) wrote a detailed 
constitutional exposition of the Southern position shortly after the Civil 
War.2  The other was Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana, who served as 
Confederate Attorney-general at the start of the War (and later as 
Secretary of War and finally Secretary of State).  He set out the Southern 
position with great care in a speech in the Senate on December 31, 1860, 
which was then published in pamphlet form.3   
This discussion will briefly outline the legal arguments in favour of 
the secessionist position.  The first section will survey four arguments 
that could, in theory, have been employed but which, in practice, were 
used either not at all or only marginally.  The second section will survey, 
in greater detail, the principal argument which was advanced in 1860-61: 
that secession was a lawful remedy available to the Southern states in the 
face of material breaches of the Constitutional compact of 1787 by the 
free states.  It will be observed that, in this argument, general 
considerations of natural law and of the law of nations played a central 
role. 
 
 1. ROBERT J. TRUNBULL, THE CRISIS, OR, ESSAYS ON THE USURPATIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT (1827). 
 2. See ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN 
THE STATES (2 vols, 1868-70) [hereinafter STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW]. 
 3. See Judah P. Benjamin, The Right of Secession, in SOUTHERN PAMPHLETS ON SECESSION, 
NOVEMBER 1860—APRIL 1861, at 101-14 (Jon L. Wakelyn ed., 1996) [hereinafter Benjamin, Right 
of Secession; and WAKELYN, SOUTHERN PAMPHLETS]. 
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II.  ARGUMENTS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED  
There were four basic arguments which might have played 
important roles in the legal justification of Southern secession but did 
not.  They are worth some brief attention, though, for two reasons.  First, 
because some of them were the subject of public debate, even if those 
debates did not play a central role in the secession crisis.  And second, as 
a way of highlighting, by contrast, the nature of the breach-of-compact 
argument which was advanced as the principal justification. 
These four alternative or subsidiary arguments for secession do not 
have standard labels.  They will be referred to here as:  first, the 
inherent-right, or voluntary-Union thesis; second, the inherent-power 
position; third, the absence-of-federal-power argument; and fourth, the 
revolutionary argument.  It will be seen that, strictly speaking, the 
second and third of these are not arguments in support of an actual right 
of secession, but are merely assertions of the ability of the Southern 
states effectually to bring secession about.  
A. The inherent-right-of-secession (or voluntary-Union) argument 
The basis of the argument for an inherent right of secession on the 
part of the Southern states (or any other states for that matter) was the 
belief that the federal Union was a purely voluntary association of states, 
terminable at will by any party at any time.  For this reason, it can be 
alternatively termed the voluntary-Union thesis.  In all events, the basic 
contention was that, as a matter of their inherent sovereign rights, the 
states of the Union were entitled at any time, as an act of unilateral will, 
to withdraw from the federal Union. 
This line of reasoning held the United States to be, in effect, an 
international organisation (in modern terminology) of sovereign nation-
states, along the lines of the League of Nations or the United Nations.  In 
the League of Nations Covenant, explicit provision was made (perhaps 
unadvisedly) for withdrawal of member states on their own unilateral 
initiative—a right that, in event, was resorted to with disconcerting 
frequency.  The UN Charter contains no analogous provision, nor is 
there any clear judicial authority on the matter.  But the predominant 
opinion is that states do possess an inherent right of withdrawal from 
international organisations as an exercise of their normal sovereign 
rights.4  The United States, it may be noted, has itself withdrawn from 
 
 4. See N. Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 39 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 189-219 (1963). 
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two organisations in the UN family: the International Labour 
Organization and UNESCO (although in due course it rejoined both).5 
Concerning this inherent-right thesis, it only remains to note a 
curious development which has yet to be adequately explored or 
explained: the fact that, while the argument was not employed at the 
time of the secessions of 1860-61, it came to attract significant support 
in the course of the conflict.  Confederate Attorney-general T. H. Watts, 
for example, asserted it in an opinion in 1862, holding that a state of the 
federal Union  
might, as a matter of right, secede, according to its will and pleasure, 
though every constitutional provision remained intact and unbroken, 
and though every law of the United States was in accordance with its 
will and pleasure.6   
The following year, in a similar vein, he maintained that the states of the 
Union had retained their sovereign rights upon joining the federal Union 
in 1789—meaning that they were entitled at any time, as a matter of 
inherent sovereign prerogative, to rescind their membership of that 
Union.7 
B. The inherent-power argument 
This argument is similar to the inherent-right argument, except that 
it focuses on power rather than on right.  According to the inherent-right 
thesis, as just discussed, there is a permanent and standing entitlement 
on the part of member states of the federal Union to rescind their 
membership.  The corresponding inherent-power argument is to the 
effect that, even if no such right exists, states nonetheless possess the 
power to reassert their full range of pre-Union sovereign rights and 
thereby to revert to the status of a fully independent nation-state.  Even if 
that power is exercised contrary to legal right—i.e., even if it constitutes 
an unjustified breach of a legally binding compact or treaty—it is 
nonetheless effectual in bringing about the end sought (withdrawal from 
the federal Union). 
 
 5. The United States withdrew from the International Labour Organization in 1977 and 
rejoined in 1980.  It withdrew from UNESCO at the end of 1984 and rejoined in 2003. 
 6. T. H. Watts, Relation of Confederacy to the Former Union (Dec. 27, 1862), in THE 
OPINIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 1861-1865, at 224 (Rembert W. Patrick ed., 
1950) [hereinafter PATRICK, OPINIONS]. 
 7. T. H. Watts, Pardon for a Deserter (Mar. 4, 1863), in PATRICK, OPINIONS, supra note 6, at 
231, 240. 
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If the power was exercised in circumstances that entailed a breach 
of a legal obligation, then the parties to whom that obligation was owed 
thereby became legally entitled to reparation for any loss which they 
suffered.  In principle, this would mean something along the lines of an 
action for money damages, comparable to damages for the breach of a 
contract when a remedy of specific performance was not available.  In 
practice, of course, no court existed with jurisdiction to order such a 
remedy.  But even if it did, the Union would nevertheless remained 
dissolved because no judicial authority could order a state to enter or re-
enter a Union with other states against its will (i.e., a remedy of specific 
performance would not be available against a seceding state to force it 
back into the Union). 
It does not appear that this argument was ever advanced, in any 
significant way, at the time of the secession crisis of 1860-61.  Perhaps 
the distinction between right and power was not strongly on the 
collective minds of lawyers and political theorists at that time.  It may be 
noted, though, if only in passing, that, after the War, this argument did 
win the explicit endorsement of a judge in the Georgia Supreme Court 
(though only in dissent, with the majority of the Court holding otherwise 
on this point).8 
C. The absence-of-federal-power argument 
This argument is closely allied to the inherent-power argument just 
discussed, in being, as it were, the flip side of it.  Where the inherent-
power thesis was a positive one, focussing on the possession of power 
by the states to effectuate secession, this argument was a negative one, 
focussing instead on the absence of any power of the federal government 
to prevent secession. 
This argument had been initially aired by Calhoun, during the 
nullification crisis of the early 1830s.  He conceded that the federal 
government had the power to act coercively against individuals, e.g., for 
violation of federal criminal laws, but it had no power, he insisted, to 
take armed action against a state as such.9  Calhoun was scornful of the 
value of a Union that could be held together only by force, invoking 
 
 8. Chancely v. Bailey, 37 Ga. 532 (1868). 
 9. John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, 
in JOHN C. CALHOUN, UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 79, 
178 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) [hereinafter Calhoun, Discourse; and UNION AND LIBERTY]. 
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instead an alternative vision of a “harmonious aggregate of States, 
produced by the joint consent of all.”10 
A position similar to that of Calhoun was also taken officially by 
Attorney-general Jeremiah S. Black, in an opinion on “The Power of the 
President in Executing the Laws,” written in November 1860, just after 
the election of Lincoln to the presidency but before the secession of 
South Carolina.11  Normally, Black noted, federal laws are executed by 
the courts, with marshals acting as the enforcement arm.12  In unusual 
cases, though, the efforts of the marshals might need to be supplemented 
by additional manpower of some kind.  But any such additional force, 
Black contended, must be ancillary to the normal operations of the 
federal courts.  “There must be courts and marshals to be aided,” he 
cautioned.13  Otherwise, “to send a military force into any State, with 
orders to act against the people, would be simply making war upon 
them”—something that the President had no power to do.14  The federal 
government, to be sure, possessed the right of self-defence, so that it was 
entitled to use force to repel actual attacks against federal installations 
such as arsenals or forts.  But this right could not be extended to allow 
the federal government to wage offensive war against states as such.  
Even Congress did not have the power to wage war against a state 
because the Congress’s Constitutional power to declare war referred, in 
Black’s view, only to waging war against foreign countries, not against 
member states of the federal Union.15 
Outgoing President James Buchanan took this advice to heart.  In 
his final annual message to Congress, in December 1860, with the 
secession crisis looming, he expressly denied that the federal 
government possessed the power to exercise coercion against states.16  
He echoed Black’s advice by holding that no branch of the federal 
government had the right or power to invoke force against a state.17  
“[T]he power to make war against a State,” he asserted, “is at variance 
with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution.”18 
 
 10. John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Revenue Collection [Force] Bill (Feb. 15-16, 1833), in 
UNION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 401, 436 [hereinafter Calhoun, Speech on the Force Bill]. 
 11. Power of the President in Executing the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y-Gen. 516 (1860). 
 12. Id. at 523. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 524. 
 16. 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 
635-36 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter RICHARDSON, COMPILATION]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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A similar conclusion was reached by Chief Justice Taney in some 
unpublished “Thoughts” on the subject of potential federal legislation to 
institute military conscription.  The federal government, thought Taney, 
“could not exercise forcibly any authority civil or military by its own 
officers within the territories of a State without its consent.”19  
D. The revolutionary argument 
The fourth and final of the arguments that might have played a 
central role in the secession debate was the revolutionary argument.  
Given the potential resonance with the patriots of 1776, it might be 
thought that this argument would have played a starring role in the legal 
drama of 1860-61.  It is interesting to note that President Buchanan 
candidly conceded at least the potential validity of a revolutionary 
argument.  “The right of resistance on the part of the governed against 
the oppression of their governments,” he asserted in his final annual 
message to Congress, “cannot be denied.  It exists independently of all 
constitutions, and has been exercised at all periods of the world’s 
history.”20 
Judah Benjamin provided a characteristically more exact analysis 
of the legal nature of this “right” of revolution.  It arose, he explained, in 
situations in which a government was exercising powers which it 
lawfully possessed, but was exercising them in an oppressive manner.21  
In such a case, remedies at law would, by the nature of the case, be 
lacking; so that the only recourse of the suffering people was the “extra-
legal” one of overthrowing the government by force.22  Revolution, in 
other words, was the appropriate remedy against what would now be 
called an abuse of right on the part of a government. 
The reason that this argument did not play an important part in the 
secession crisis may be stated briefly here: that the Southern leaders 
were not alleging oppression of the Southern states by the federal 
government.  They could even be said to have been complaining of the 
very opposite: that the federal government was insufficiently powerful, 
that its policies—notably the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act23—
were being thwarted by disruptive persons (and state governments) in 
 
 19. See ROGER B. TANEY, THOUGHTS ON THE CONSCRIPTION LAW OF THE U[NITED] 
STATES—ROUGH DRAFT REQUIRING REVISION 3 (Philip G. Auchampaugh ed., n.d.). 
 20. RICHARDSON, COMPILATION, supra note 16, at 634. 
 21. Benjamin, Right of Secession, supra note 3, at 107-08. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462. 
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the North.  This contention will be expanded on presently.24  Here, it is 
sufficient simply to note that the true legal grievances of the Southern 
states were not against the federal government as such, but rather against 
the Northern states, which (in the Southern view) were undermining the 
effectiveness of federal policies.  
It may be noted that, in the course of the conflict, the South did find 
occasion to assert a revolutionary argument for secession.  This was 
inspired by an act of the Union government which inspired particular 
loathing in the South: the arming and employment of ex-slaves as 
soldiers in the Union cause.  One form that the Confederate reaction 
took was the insistence that black soldiers were (in modern parlance) 
unlawful combatants and that they would accordingly not be accorded 
prisoner-of-war treatment if captured.  More to the point for present 
purposes, though, was the text of a Manifesto on the War which was 
promulgated by the Confederate Congress in June 1864.  Now echoing 
the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the Richmond Congress 
asserted “the right of a free people, when a government proves 
destructive of the ends for which it was established, to recur to original 
principles and to institute new guards to their security.”25 
III.  THE BREACH-OF-COMPACT THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATION 
The legal argument that was actually deployed by the Southern 
leaders in 1860-61 may be characterised as the breach-of-compact 
theory.  Its essence is simple.  The federal Union, properly understood, 
was an ongoing contractual union between sovereign states—states 
which retained all aspects of their sovereignty after entry into the Union, 
save those that they had expressly delegated to the federal government.  
That original Constitutional contract—or compact—like any other 
contract, retained its legal validity only so long as the parties continued 
faithfully to adhere to it.  Any breach of the compact by parties to it 
automatically entitled the innocent parties to withdraw from the 
arrangement. 
Support for this line of argument in the text of the Constitution 
itself was altogether absent.  There was no real question, therefore, of 
Constitutional interpretation here.  Instead, the argument rested on a 
certain understanding about the general character of the federal Union as 
 
 24. See the text at note 82 infra. 
 25. Joint Res. Declaring the Dispositions, Principles and Purposes of the Confederate States in 
Relation to the Existing War with the United States, Joint Res. No. 13, June 14, 1864, reprinted in 
STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1864). 
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such, fortified by arguments drawn from writings about general natural 
law. 
More specifically, the breach-of-compact argument for secession 
relied for its credibility, in essence, on the establishment of four key 
propositions.  The first three are points of law and the fourth of fact.  
First was that the true nature of the federal Union was as a compact 
between sovereign states, rather than as a single national government.  
Second was that a material breach of the covenant gave rise to the lawful 
remedy of rescission.  Third was an assertion of the necessity for self-
judgment for the determination of the existence of such a breach.  Fourth 
and finally, there was the application of these three legal principles to 
the facts of the particular situation of 1860-61, in the form of concrete 
evidence of actual violation of the federal compact by the Northern 
states.  We shall look more closely at each of these in turn. 
A. The compact theory of the federal Union 
The first and most basic, underlying component of the secessionist 
case was the thesis that the American federal Union was a Union of 
sovereign states rather than a single nation-state.  This Union was, 
concededly, the creation of the “people” of the United States, but only in 
an indirect manner.  The American people created the Union not by 
giving their approval as a single population of individual persons, but 
rather through the media of the various sovereign states into which they 
were then divided—and into which they continued to be divided for all 
purposes save those expressly transferred to the Union government.  The 
case for and against this basic compact theory has been analysed before, 
so that only its most salient points need be noted here. 
The compact theory received its first systematic treatment at the 
hands of Calhoun.26  The federal government, in his words, was “the 
government of a community of States, and not the government of a 
single State or nation.”27  The United States, in other words, must be 
regarded as a union of pre-existing political communities and not as a 
single society of individuals, as was the case for a true nation-state.  
Moreover, these pre-existing political communities retained their 
character as sovereign states even after forming the Union, with the 
result that they were bound together, as separate entities, in a continuing, 
ongoing contractual relationship.  Calhoun insisted that sovereignty was, 
by its nature, single and indivisible and that sovereignty remained with 
 
 26. See generally Calhoun, Discourse, supra note 9. 
 27. Id. at 82. 
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the states.  The federal Union was therefore not a sovereign entity in its 
own right, but a mere vehicle or tool of the states, created by them for 
the fulfilment of their purposes. 
It must not be thought that Calhoun invented the compact theory 
out of whole cloth.  It had at least a measure of support from the 
Founding Fathers themselves.  James Madison, for example, in the 39th 
Federalist Paper, expressly described the establishment of the 
Constitution (though not the day-to-day operation of the federal 
government) as “not . . . a national, but a federal act.”28  The founding of 
the Union, Madison went on to say, was “the act of the people, as 
forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate 
nation.”29  The character of the Union as a compact of states was further 
evident, Madison pointed out, in the fact that, as in the case of contracts 
generally, adherence was purely voluntary on the part of each party—in 
sharp contrast to the position in a political society, in which the majority 
will would bind the minority. 
Further support for the compact theory could be adduced from the 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, drafted by Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison respectively.  Madison’s Virginia 
Resolution expressly described the powers of the federal government as 
“resulting from [a] compact.”30  And it went on to lament any tendency 
“to consolidate the states by degrees, into one sovereignty.”31  
Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution was similar in tone, proclaiming each 
state to have acceded “to this compact . . . as a State,” with “its co-States 
forming as to itself, the other party” to the compact.32 
The compact theory of the Union, not surprisingly, met with fierce 
opposition.  And no opponent of it was fiercer than the redoubtable 
Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts.  He asserted with 
characteristic force and eloquence, most notably in the famous Senate 
debate against Robert Hayne in 1830, that the compact theory was 
fundamentally unsound, asserting instead that the federal Union was “the 
independent offspring of the popular will” of the American people at 
 
 28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 24, 1798, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 182 (Henry 
Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS]. 
 31. Id. at 178. 
 32. Kentucky Resolutions, Nov. 16, 1798, in COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 178. 
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large.33  The Constitution, he insisted, was the creation “of the people of 
the United States, in the aggregate.”34 
Even the eloquence of Daniel Webster did not suffice to dislodge 
the Southerners from their attachment to the compact theory.  They 
maintained it up to the Civil War and even beyond, with Stephens now 
as their spokesman-in-chief.35  The compact theory also received official 
support from the Confederate government.  In 1863, Confederate 
Attorney-general Watts opined that the population of the United States 
“never constituted one and the same community,” nor did the United 
States, as such, ever constitute a nation.36 
B. The remedy of rescission for breach of compact under natural law 
This second crucial proposition—that the remedy of termination of 
the compact (i.e., of secession) was available in cases of breach of a 
compact—lay at the very core of the Southern case for lawful secession.  
It should be noted that this thesis is not logically entailed by the compact 
theory as such.  It was logically possible to see the Union as a compact 
of states while holding at the same time that that Union was not 
terminable for any reason.37  The issue of terminability of the Union is 
therefore conceptually distinct from the question of the underlying 
nature of the Union—a point that was clearly understood by all parties to 
the debates. 
The issue over the terminability of the Union has sometimes been 
seen as a debate over whether or not the federal Union was, or was 
intended at its outset to be, a perpetual one.38  That is a misleading way 
of putting it, because the word “perpetual” may be understood in either 
of two quite distinct senses.  These could be termed the “strong” and the 
“weak” senses.  Perpetual in the strong sense means that the Union is 
indissoluble in any circumstance whatsoever—i.e., that, upon joining the 
federal Union, a state thereby alienated, irrevocably and in perpetuity, all 
right and power to withdraw from the Union.  Perpetual in the weak 
 
 33. THE WEBSTER-HAYNE DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF THE UNION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 
136, 153 (Herman Belz ed., 2000). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See 1 STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW, supra note 2, at 477-522. 
 36. T. H. Watts, Pardon for a Deserter (Mar. 4, 1863), in PATRICK, OPINIONS, supra note 6, 
at 231, 239-40. 
 37. See for example, the Georgia Supreme Court case of Chancely v. Bailey, 37 Ga. 532 
(1868). 
 38. See for example, Kenneth Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Union, 65 J. AM. HIST. 5 
(1978). 
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sense means that the Union was perpetual in principle, or that it was 
intended at the outset to be perpetual—but that this aspiration of 
perpetuity could only be achieved in reality by the continued adherence 
of the parties to the original arrangements over time.  According to this 
weak view of perpetuity, then, a state, upon joining the Union, 
surrenders only its right to withdraw from the Union as a matter of 
unilateral sovereign will.  It is left with the possibility of withdrawal as a 
lawful remedy for breach of the compact by the other parties to it.39  The 
position of the advocates of secession in the 1860-61 crisis was that the 
Union was a perpetual one in the weak sense, but not in the strong sense. 
On this subject too, the views of Benjamin are particularly 
instructive, as he addressed the question of the perpetual character of the 
federal Union very explicitly.  He candidly conceded that, in principle, 
the federal Union was a perpetual one—though, crucially, in the weak 
sense rather than the strong one.  “[N]o man pretends,” insisted 
Benjamin, “that the generation of to-day is not bound by the compacts of 
the fathers.”40  But he went on to contend that the real issue at hand was 
not whether the Union had been envisaged as perpetual in the 1780s.  It 
had been.  The issue was whether, since that time, that Union had been 
irredeemably shattered by the failure of the Northern states to abide by 
their commitments under the original Constitutional compact.  The 
compact remained binding, Benjamin maintained, only so long as all 
parties continued to adhere to it.41 
That it would be wrong to regard the secession advocates as 
enemies of perpetual unions per se is evident from no less authoritative a 
source than the Confederate Constitution itself.  That document did not 
include a provision granting the states a right to secede at will.  On the 
contrary, it explicitly stated, in the Preamble, the intention of the 
Southern states “to form a permanent federal government”42—
permanent, it is safe to conclude, in the weak rather than the strong 
sense.  
The Southerners’ proposition that the federal Union of 1787-89 was 
perpetual only in the weak sense (i.e., was terminable in the event of 
breach) was, however, nowhere to be found in the Constitution, which 
made no provision for breaches by states.  To be sure, there was the 
 
 39. The informative discussion in Stampp, id., is concerned only with perpetuity in the strong 
sense. 
 40. Benjamin, Right of Secession, supra note 3, at 104. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Constitution of the Confederate States of America, Mar. 3, 1861, in COMMAGER, 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 376. 
9- NEFF_MACRO.DOCM 6/13/2012  3:39 PM 
2012] SECESSION AND BREACH OF COMPACT 417 
Supremacy Clause.  But that spoke to a different problem: the possibility 
of a clash between a state law and a federal law.  It shed no light 
whatever on how to resolve a clash between the states over a breach of 
terms of adherence to the federal Union itself.  Authority for the 
existence of this remedy of rescission would therefore have to be found 
outside the framework of the Constitution. 
The justification for this remedy was duly found in natural law, 
which was an integral part of the mental universe of American lawyers 
in the early and mid-nineteenth century.  It was one of the most 
venerable intellectual ornaments of Western civilisation, older than 
Christianity itself.  Its basic thesis was that law, in its most fundamental 
guise, was a set of statements of principles of universal and permanent 
validity.  Its strictures prevailed in all countries and all civilizations and 
in all times.  It was painfully obvious that its tenets were all too 
frequently violated in practice, but these violations, however frequent, 
could have no effect on the essential validity of this body of law.  
Natural-law thought is therefore in sharp contrast with schools of legal 
philosophy (most notably the positivist one) which holds law to 
comprise the expression of the will of a given sovereign, expressed in 
the form of commands issued to a subject population, and with the 
prospect of punishment for disobedience of those commands.43  There 
were various different theories as to how the contents of natural law 
were to be discovered.  But the one that was most prominent in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries held natural law to be discoverable 
through the exercise of human reason.  This was a doctrine put 
forcefully by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages44 and expounded by a 
line of writers in the centuries that followed.  The most prestigious of 
these was Hugo Grotius,45 in the seventeenth century, followed by the 
 
 43. There is, surprisingly, no single treatment of natural law that traces its entire historical 
trajectory.  See, however, CLARENCE J. GLACKEN, TRACES ON THE RHODIAN SHORE: NATURE AND 
CULTURE IN WESTERN THOUGHT FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
(1967), a stimulating book with a wealth of information on key elements of natural-law thought 
over a large part of its history. 
 44. For Aquinas’s principal writings on natural law, see THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. 
THOMAS AQUINAS: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 42-54 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953).  See also A. 
P. D’ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 42-49 (2d ed. 1970); 
D. J. O’CONNOR, AQUINAS AND NATURAL LAW (1967); and ANTHONY LISSKA, AQUINAS’S 
THEORY OF NATURAL LAW: AN ANALYTIC RECONSTRUCTION (1996). 
 45. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) 
(1625) [hereinafter GROTIUS, WAR AND PEACE]. 
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German writers Samuel Pufendorf46 and Christian Wolff,47 as well as by 
the Swiss writer Emmerich de Vattel.48 
Most pertinent of these natural-law writers for the American 
tradition was John Locke, in the late seventeenth century, whose 
writings were echoed by Jefferson and others amongst the Founding 
Fathers of the American Republic in the eighteenth century.  In the 
tradition of his forebears of the rationalist tradition of natural law, Locke 
insisted that one of the important tenets of natural law was the duty to 
adhere to contracts.49  This fundamental principle applies not only to 
individual persons, but also to political collectives and even to God 
Himself.50 
This law of nature was applicable, in its purest form, to persons 
who were living in what was called a state of nature vis-à-vis one 
another.  A state of nature, for this purpose, was, in essence, a condition 
in which no common sovereign existed over the persons in question—
with the inevitable result that relations between them were governed 
solely by natural law.  Once a political society was established (whether 
peacefully by contract or violently through coercion or conquest), 
natural law could be overridden or superseded by the commands of the 
established sovereign.  The effect, then, was that natural law operated as 
a kind of continuous “default law,” which would be applicable in any 
situation in which there was no holder of sovereign power to promulgate 
laws or adjudicate disputes. 
Locke was also very clear in his exposition of another aspect of this 
question: what was to be done, under natural law, in the event that a 
party to a contract violated its duty of obedience.  The remedy, Locke 
explained, was self-enforcement.  This was the only possibility because, 
by definition, no sovereign power existed who could undertake the 
enforcement.  As Locke put it, one of the key powers held by all persons 
in a state of nature (as defined above) was the power “to judge of, and 
 
 46. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (C. H. & W. A. Oldfather 
trans., 1934) (1672) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, NATURE AND NATIONS]. 
 47. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (1749) [hereinafter WOLFF, LAW OF NATIONS]. 
 48. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND THE AFFAIRS OF THE NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (Charles G. 
Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) [hereinafter VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS]. 
 49. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 121-
22, 214 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993) [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise].  On the natural-law duty to 
adhere to contracts, see also THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENT OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 87-
88 (J. C. A. Gaskin ed., 1994) (1650). 
 50. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 49, at 214. 
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punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence 
deserves.”51  This could even go to the point of inflicting capital 
punishment onto a miscreant (provided that such drastic punishment was 
duly proportionate to the wrong committed).52 
In a political society, Locke maintained, this natural-law power of 
self-judgment and self-execution was transferred from the ordinary 
citizens to the sovereign (whether by free will or by force, as the case 
may be).  This was, in fact, for all practical purposes the very definition 
of a political society for writers in the natural-law tradition.  The 
inevitable logical corollary was that, wherever and whenever this 
transfer of natural-law power had not been effectuated, it remained in 
force.  “[W]herever there are any number of men, however associated,” 
Locke explained, “that have no such decisive power [i.e., no sovereign] 
to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.”53  In such a state, 
each party must remain “judge for himself, and executioner” in the event 
that a dispute arose.54 
The question then arose as to just what form this self-help action of 
enforcement could take.  It could be argued that the innocent party, in a 
breach-of-contract scenario, could resort to force, on a sort of analogy 
with self-defence—that is, that could exert however much force (and no 
more) as was necessary under the circumstances to compel obedience 
from the recalcitrant party.  More commonly, though, natural-law writers 
spoke in terms of a right of rescission of the contract on the part of the 
innocent party.  As Hugo Grotius explained in his treatise On the Law of 
War and Peace, “the individual terms of an alliance have the force of 
conditions”—with the effect that a violation by one party enables the 
other to withdraw.55  In a similar vein, Pufendorf held: 
[W]hen one party does not perform what is agreed upon, the other is 
not obligated to perform what he agreed to in exchange and in 
consideration of the other’s performance.  For whoever promises 
another something by a pact, does so not absolutely and gratis, but in 
consideration of what the other has undertaken to perform; and so the 
performances of each for the other take on the form of a condition. . . .  
 
 51. Id. at 157.   
 52. Id. at 118. 
 53. Id. at 159. 
 54. Id. at 158. 
 55. GROTIUS, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 45, at 405.  The fact that the reference was 
specifically to treaties of alliance is not crucial. 
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But it is fixed that whatever is built upon a condition falls to the 
ground when the condition does not appear.56 
Similar too, as well as more succinct, was Wolff:  “If one party shall 
have violated a treaty,” he pronounced, “the other party . . . can 
withdraw from it.”57  He agreed with Pufendorf that, in every treaty 
which contained mutual promises, the due performance of those 
promises by either party must be regarded as conditions for the 
reciprocal performance by the other one.  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the 
French political philosopher, was also of this view.  Each party to a 
contract, he contended, “would always have a right to renounce the 
contract, as soon as he found that the other had violated its terms.”58 
More directly familiar to American lawyers and political writers 
would have been Vattel, whose treatise On the Law of Nations of 1758 
was widely known in American legal circles.  A breach of a treaty by 
one party, Vattel asserted, entitled the other to resort to armed force to 
compel performance (i.e., it was a cause for the waging of a just war, in 
the parlance of the time).  But an alternative, and less drastic, remedy 
was rescission of the treaty: 
[I]t is at times more expedient [Vattel explained] for the [injured 
innocent] State to revoke its own promises and to break the treaty; it is 
unquestionably justified in doing so, since its own promises were made 
only on condition that the other State would carry out on its part the 
stipulations of the treaty.59 
“Prudence and policy,” he maintained, would decide which of the 
available options the injured state would choose on a given occasion.60 
Closer still to home was the word of the American writer on 
international law (as well as Supreme Court reporter and diplomat) 
Henry Wheaton.  Speaking in the context of treaties of peace, he echoed 
Vattel in holding that a violation by one party “abrogates the whole 
treaty, if the injured party so elects to consider it.”61  He went on to 
 
 56. PUFENDORF, NATURE AND NATIONS, supra note 46, at 788. 
 57. WOLFF, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 47, at 225-26. 
 58. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN, 
AND IS IT AUTHORIZED BY NATURAL LAW? 97 (G. D. H. Cole trans., 1973) (1755) [hereinafter 
ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE]. 
 59. VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 48, at 177. 
 60. Id. 
 61. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 604 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 
1936) (1836). 
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explain that the effect of this principle is that the violated treaty becomes 
“not absolutely void, but voidable at the election of the injured party.”62 
The application of this reasoning to the American situation in 1860-
61 led to a clear conclusion to adherents of the compact theory of the 
Union.  On the basis of the compact theory, they insisted that the states 
retained their sovereign status even after entry into the federal union and 
that, consequently, the federal government was not a sovereign with 
authority over the states.  The federal government was merely a vehicle 
created by the sovereign states to carry out certain limited functions that 
had been entrusted to it in the original federal compact of 1787.  
Consistently with this view, Southern writers tended to insist that there 
was no such thing as citizenship of the United States as such.  There was 
only citizenship of the individual states.63 
As a result (went the argument on the compact theory), the states of 
the American Union must be regarded as being in a state of nature vis-à-
vis one another.  More specifically, the provisions of Article III of the 
Constitution, outlining the jurisdiction of the federal courts, contained no 
grant of jurisdiction over issues of the kind presented in the 1850s.  It 
did grant the federal courts jurisdiction over “Controversies between two 
or more States.”64  But it appears to have been generally agreed that this 
referred to the adjudication of competing claims by states to rights of 
some kind, such as a dispute over a boundary or territory.  It did not 
apply to accusations by one state that another one was impeding 
enforcement of federal law (i.e., of the Fugitive Slave Act) within its 
territory. 
The states, to be sure, were bound to adhere to agreements which 
they made.  But it was general natural law which so bound them, rather 
than the commands of a sovereign federal government.  By the same 
token, it was natural law which conferred the remedy of rescission in the 
event of violation of any such agreement.  Alexander Stephens was very 
explicit on this point.  The right of rescission, he explained, “comes not 
from any thing in the Constitution, but from the great law of Nations, 
governing all Compacts between Sovereigns.”65  This right of rescission, 
he went on to emphasise, finds its source in the general law of nations, 
which provides for “the right . . . to abrogate a treaty by either or any of 
 
 62. Id. at 603-04. 
 63. See Calhoun, Speech on the Force Bill, supra note 10, at 443-44; and 2 STEPHENS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW, supra note 2, at 426. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 65. 1 STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW, supra note 2, at 500-01. 
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the parties to it.”66  He conceded that this right (or rather remedy) “is 
seldom set forth in the treaty itself, and yet it exists, whether it be set 
forth or not. . . .  [W]here no such provision is made, the right exists by 
the same laws of Nations which govern in all matters of treaties or 
conventions between Sovereigns.”67 
Several points about this remedy of rescission for breach of the 
federal compact should be noted with care.  One was that it was 
generally agreed, in natural-law writing, that this right of rescission in 
the event of a breach of a compact was subject to one marginal caveat: 
that it was open to the makers of a compact, at the time of contracting, 
expressly to exclude rescission as a remedy for breach.  In terms of the 
federal Union, the effect of such an express arrangement would be to 
make the Union a perpetual one in the strong sense rather than in merely 
the weak one.  It was therefore necessary to the Southern thesis to insist 
that, in the case of the American Constitution, no such express provision 
had been made. 
Another point to note is how different the legal quandary of the 
Southern states was from that of the American colonies in the 1770s, 
despite a certain amount of emotional appeal to the example of the 
Founding Fathers.  The American colonists in the 1770s had alleged that 
they were oppressed by their lawful sovereign, the monarch of Great 
Britain.  That is to say, they were reacting against an alleged abuse of 
powers by a political superior.  Their action was therefore revolutionary 
in the strict sense that Benjamin had explained, in that it was an 
overthrowing a sovereign power that was prima facie lawful (though 
oppressive). 
The Southern states were making a very different claim in 1860.  
They were not contending that the federal government was inflicting 
oppression upon them, in the manner of King George III in days of old.  
It could even be said that they were making the very opposite claim: that 
the federal government, far from being an oppressor, was actually, in 
effect, itself a victim of wrongdoing by the Northern states.  It was a 
victim in the sense that its attempts to enforce the law of the land (i.e., of 
the Fugitive Slave Act) were being thwarted by lawless elements in the 
Northern states, with the more or less active collaboration of the state 
governments. 
The legal grievances of the Southern states therefore had 
remarkably little to do with the federal government per se.  This may 
 
 66. Id. at 501. 
 67. Id. 
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appear surprising in light of the fact that the Civil War, as it unfolded, 
became a gigantic effort by the federal government to bring the 
rebellious Southern states to terms.  Similarly, the post-Civil War period 
witnessed a long-term (if often rather low-key) struggle between the 
federal government and the Southern states over issues of “states’ rights” 
(most outstandingly, of course, concerning the civil and political rights 
of ex-slaves and their descendants in the Southern states).  But it was 
only with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
in 1870, with its grant to the federal government of a degree of 
supervisory power over the states, that the grand contest between federal 
rights and states’ rights came to assume its familiar modern form.68 
On the eve of the Civil War, the Southern leaders were champions 
of states’ rights in a very different way.  They were championing the 
rights not so much of the states vis-à-vis the federal government, but 
rather rights of one class of states against another class of states—i.e., 
the rights of the class of law-abiding states against the class of nullifying 
states.  Far from struggling against a usurpatious federal government—
as had been the case in the nullification crisis of the 1830s—the 
Southern states were now staunchly on the side of that same federal 
government, seeking to prevent the Northern states from, in effect, 
following nullification policies of their own against the Fugitive Slave 
Act. 
C. The necessity of self-judgment 
The third key conceptual pillar of the Southern argument for the 
lawfulness of secession lay in the right of parties to a dispute—still 
under the authority of general natural law—to determine for themselves 
when their own rights had been infringed.  Few legal clichés would win 
readier consent than the proposition that a person should not be the judge 
in his or her own cause.69 
In the natural-law tradition, however, there was venerable authority 
for holding this proposition to be importantly restricted in scope: to 
disputes which occur in politically organized society.  In those cases, it 
is the duty of the disputants to submit to the judgment of their sovereign.  
 
 68. For a general historical survey of the Fourteenth Amendment, see RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 
1997). 
 69. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 84-85, 93-103 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1957) 
(1651).  See also THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE, OF THE CITIZEN 43-59 (Sterling Lamprecht ed., 1949) 
(1642). 
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For persons in a state of nature (i.e., in the absence of such a sovereign), 
however, this principle cannot apply because, by definition, there is no 
sovereign.  In such a situation, there can be no alternative to allowing 
each party to a dispute to reach its own judgement as to when its rights 
have been violated.  Rousseau expressed a similar view.  In the absence 
of a judge with jurisdiction over a dispute, he posited, “the parties would 
be sole judges in their own cause.”70 
In his discussion of this point, Locke was under no illusion that this 
state of affairs was unsatisfactory, for the obvious reason that each party 
will naturally insist on the rightness of its own position.71  It is for just 
such a reason that a politically organised society is preferable to a state 
of nature.  But so long as the state of nature persists, there simply is no 
alternative to allowing self-judgment of disputes.  The only consolation 
that Locke could offer was to assure his readers that persons in the state 
of nature who abused this prerogative would be “answerable for it to the 
rest of mankind.”72 
In the 1860-61 crisis, Benjamin articulated this position.  Political 
disputes, he contended, are, in general, not justiciable—not necessarily 
because they are inherently incapable of being decided by courts, but 
rather because of the absence of any court possessing the requisite 
jurisdiction.73  In this situation, Benjamin contended, “natural law and 
the law of nations” dictates that the state parties to the Constitutional 
compact must judge their own injuries themselves.74 
This characterisation of the dispute between the slave and free 
states as a political question naturally calls to mind the political-question 
doctrine in general Constitutional jurisprudence.  But there was an 
important difference.  The political-question doctrine in general 
Constitutional law refers, basically, to issues which, by their nature, are 
not susceptible of judicial resolution.  Such questions must therefore be 
hammered out by other branches of the government through normal 
political processes.75  The dispute between the slave and free states in 
1860-61 was not, however, of that character.  As a straightforward claim 
of breach of compact, it would seem eminently suitable for judicial 
resolution—if, that is, a court were at hand with jurisdiction to hear the 
 
 70. ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE, supra note 58, at 96-97. 
 71. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 49, at 121. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Benjamin, Right of Secession, supra note 3, at 107. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).  For the leading modern exposition of 
the doctrine, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1963). 
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case.  The general political-question doctrine, in other words, requires an 
initial finding that a dispute, by its nature, is political, with the 
consequential effect that courts are then deprived of a jurisdiction which 
they would otherwise have had.  That is to say, courts lack jurisdiction 
because the issue at hand is political.  In the secession crisis, the 
conceptual arrow of causation pointed in the opposite direction: the 
question of a breach of compact was a political one, not because of its 
intrinsic character, but only because of the absence of jurisdiction by 
courts, so that the issue became political by virtue of that absence of 
jurisdiction.  
In all events, support for self-help action on the part of states that 
were victims of violations of the Constitution went as far back as the 
Federalist Papers, in which Hamilton had considered the hypothetical 
case of usurpation of state powers by either the federal government or 
the states.76  The solution, he proposed rather vaguely, was that each of 
these political bodies would naturally “stand ready to check the 
usurpations” of the other.77  And the issue between them would be 
decided, ultimately, by “[t]he people,” who would support one side or 
the other as they judged best.78  Moreover, if the rights of “the people” 
were to be invaded by, say, the federal government, then the remedy 
(again rather vaguely) would be for the aggrieved “people” to “make use 
of” their state government to “adopt a regular plan of opposition” against 
the impending oppression.79  Conversely, if the offending government 
was the state, then the “people” would react by lending their support to 
the federal government.  If more than one state was a victim of federal 
encroachment, then the affected states could combine their efforts and 
thereby render resistance more effective. 
The important point to note about Hamilton’s thesis is that it 
envisaged political, rather than judicial, action against usurpations of 
power under the Constitution.  He made no attempt to pretend that any 
court would have jurisdiction to resolve the matter.  The basic theory, 
therefore, was one of countervailing political powers.  In such a system, 
there was simply no alternative to self-judgment on the part of the 
contending parties.  Each was necessarily left to determine for itself 
when its own rights had been infringed,  and in the event of clashing 
opinions on the matter between different branches or levels of 
 
 76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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government, the decision must rest ultimately—somehow or other—with 
the “people.” 
It is true that Hamilton’s immediate concern was with a conflict 
between the federal government and one or more states (as in the case of 
the nullification crisis of the 1830s).  But at the heart of his argument, if 
only implicitly, was the thesis that, in the absence of jurisdiction by any 
court, a clash between governments within a federal system could only 
be resolved by political means—and this process inevitably and 
necessarily entailed self-judgment by the contending parties. 
D. Applying the facts of 1860-61 to the law 
As the fourth and final step in the making of the legal case for 
secession, it only remained to apply the facts of the case to the legal 
framework just outlined—i.e., to establish that the terms of the federal 
compact had in fact been violated by the Northern states.  In the eyes of 
the secession advocates, that was the easiest step of all.  Foremost 
amongst the accusations against the Northern states were allegations of 
violation of the Fugitive Slave Act, that notorious centrepiece of the 
Compromise of 1850. 
The 1850 Act did not, of course, come out of a vacuum.  The 
Constitution itself had made explicit provision on the subject, setting out 
the general principle that an escaping slave could not thereby be 
discharged from his “Service or Labour.”80  In other words, the act of 
escaping did not alter a slave’s legal status as a slave or deprive the 
master of his rights incidental to ownership.  The Clause also provided 
that an escaping slave “shall be delivered up” upon claim by the 
master.81  Only in 1850, though, did Congress enact legislation setting 
up a permanent system of commissioners charged specifically with the 
capture and return of slaves—a system which, crucially, operated in the 
territory of the free states. 
The essence of the Southern case for secession, then, was that the 
Northern ones were in breach of the Constitutional compact because of 
their attempts to nullify federal law by interfering with enforcement of 
the Fugitive Slave Act.  With scrupulous exactitude, the Georgia 
politician Howell Cobb maintained that ten states of the Union “have 
interposed their strong arm to protect the thief, punish the owner [of 
 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 81. Id. 
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slaves], and confiscate the property of a citizen of a sister State.”82  This 
amounted, he insisted, to “the plain and palpable violation of the 
constitutional compact” on the part of these ten “nullifying States” (as he 
bluntly designated them).83  Stephens, in a similar vein, contended that 
thirteen of the Northern states had “openly and avowedly disregarded 
their obligations” under two key provisions of the Constitution: the 
Fugitive Slave Clause, and the Extradition Clause.84  The result was that, 
“by public law they [the Southern states] had a perfect right to 
withdraw” from the Union.85  The Virginians were not to be outdone in 
this regard.  R. M. T. Hunter accused the Northern states of waging “a 
regular warfare” against the Southern slave system, “the practical effect 
of which was to nullify the fugitive slave law.”86 
These same accusations appeared in official form in the 
declarations issued by several of the Southern states on the causes of 
secession.  The South Carolina Declaration, for example, asserted that 
fourteen of the free states “have deliberately refused, for years past, to 
fulfil their constitutional obligations, and as a result, “the laws of the 
General Government have ceased to effect the objects of the 
Constitution.”87  The Declaration went on to state the legal essence of 
the Southern position with exquisite precision: 
We maintain [proclaimed the South Carolina secession convention] 
that in every compact between two or more parties, the obligation is 
mutual; that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a 
material part of the agreement, entirely releases the obligation of the 
other; and that, where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to 
its own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its 
consequences.88 
The declaration of the causes of secession issued by Georgia was 
particularly eloquent on this subject.  Claimants of fugitive slaves, it 
proclaimed, “are murdered with impunity; officers of the law are beaten 
 
 82. Cobb, Letter . . . to the People of Georgia, in WAKELYN, SOUTHERN PAMPHLETS, supra 
note 3, at 88, 90, 94. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 1 STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW, supra note 2, at 497. 
 85. 2 STEPHENS, CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW, supra note 2, at 261-62. 
 86. Hunter, Speech . . . on the Resolution Proposing to Retrocede the Forts . . . Delivered in 
the Senate of the United States, Jan 11, 1861, in WAKELYN, SOUTHERN PAMPHLETS, supra note 3, 
at 262, 264. 
 87. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South 
Carolina from the Federal Union, Dec. 24, 1860, in COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 
372, 373. 
 88. Id. at 373. 
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by frantic mobs instigated by inflammatory appeals from persons 
holding the highest public employment in these States, and supported by 
legislation in conflict with the clearest provisions of the Constitution, 
and even the ordinary principles of humanity.”89  In broadly similar, if 
slightly more measured terms, Mississippi’s declaration asserted that the 
hostility of Northern populations “has nullified the Fugitive Slave Law 
in almost every free State in the Union, and has utterly broken the 
compact which our fathers pledged their faith to maintain.”90  The Texas 
declaration solemnly asserted “that the federal constitution has been 
violated and virtually abrogated” by the Northern states.91 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It only remains to make two final, and related, observations relating 
to some broader aspects and implications of the secession experience of 
1860-61.  The first concerns the fate of the compact theory of the federal 
Union, that essential conceptual foundation-stone of the secessionist 
case.  In 1871, Justice Joseph P. Bradley of the federal Supreme Court 
pronounced it to have been “definitely and forever overthrown.”92  What 
Justice Bradley tactfully left unmentioned was that overthrow had taken 
place on the fields of battle rather than in the panelled rooms of courts or 
legislatures.  The question of the nature of the federal Union, in event, 
proved to be neither a judicial nor a political question, but a military one. 
The compact theory became, in other words, a sort of specialised 
juridical version of the Lost Cause of Southern independence in general.  
But there is a further, and little noted, parallel between the legal situation 
and the general political fate of the South.  Just as Southerners regained 
much of their political strength after the War and Reconstruction—
sufficient to delay the enjoyment of effective civil rights for Southern 
blacks for nearly a century—so also did at least some of their legal 
arguments live on for years to come. 
In particular, appeals to natural law and related principles in 
support of existing social and economic arrangements, far from dying 
 
 89. Declaration of the Causes of Secession of Georgia, Jan. 29, 1861, 1 (ser. 4) OR 81-85. 
 90. A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the 
State of Mississippi from the Federal Union, Jan. 9, 1861, in JOURNAL OF THE STATE CONVENTION 
86-88 (Jackson, State Printer, 1861). 
 91. A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal 
Union, Feb. 2, 1861, in JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 61-66 (E.W. Winkler 
ed., 1912). 
 92. See, for example, the concurring opinion of Justice Bradley in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 
Wall.) 457, 555 (1871) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
9- NEFF_MACRO.DOCM 6/13/2012  3:39 PM 
2012] SECESSION AND BREACH OF COMPACT 429 
out after the Civil War, lived a long and robust life.  Not any longer, of 
course, in support of the specific institution of slavery.  But natural-law 
arguments continued to be regularly invoked as buttresses of the status 
quo—for example, in support of the principle of unlimited freedom of 
contract (against social-welfare legislation) and of the rights of property 
holders (against various forms of wealth redistribution and government 
regulation).  This was in sharp contrast to the appeal to natural law by 
political liberals and revolutionaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries—including, notably, the American colonies in their quest for 
independence.  How it was that so dramatic a change occurred in so 
short a period of time is one of the yet-untold stories of the history of 
jurisprudential thought.  The Southern arguments for the lawfulness of 
secession should therefore be seen, not as mere historical curiosities—
interesting though they undoubtedly are in that regard—but also as part 
of a far more general, and largely successful, effort to enlist the law of 
nature on the side of the forces of conservatism. 
